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Abstract
We propose a method of formally analysing security protocols based on rewriting.
The method is roughly as follows. A security protocol is modeled as an observational
transition system, which is described in CafeOBJ. Proof scores showing that the
protocol has safety (security) properties are then written in CafeOBJ and the proof
scores are executed (rewritten) by the CafeOBJ system.
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1 Introduction
Security protocols such as authentication ones are key technology if we ex-
change messages secretly and/or authentically over an open network such as
the Internet. But, they are subject to subtle faults that are especially diﬃcult
to ﬁnd by testing and usual operation. Even if cryptosystems used are hard
to break, there could be attacks to break security protocols that are seemingly
well designed such as Lowe’s attack[15] to the Needham-Schroeder Public-Key
authentication protocol (the NSPK protocol)[18]. Therefore, several methods
of formally analysing security protocols have been proposed[2,4,9,16,21,22].
In this paper, we propose a method of formally analysing security protocols
based on rewriting. The method is roughly as follows. A security protocol
is modeled as an observational transition system[19,20], which is described in
CafeOBJ[1,5]. Proof scores showing that the protocol has safety (security)
properties are then written in CafeOBJ and the proof scores are executed
(rewritten) by the CafeOBJ system. The CafeOBJ system can be used as
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an interactive proof-checker or veriﬁer on several levels[10]. In the proposed
method, the CafeOBJ system is used as proof score executor. The NSPK
protocol corrected by Lowe[15] is used to show our method.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 mentions CafeOBJ.
Observational transition systems and a way of describing them in CafeOBJ
are written in Sect 3. Section 4 gives a brief description of the NSPK protocol
corrected by Lowe. Section 5 describes the observational transition system
modeling the protocol and its speciﬁcation in CafeOBJ. Section 6 shows (part
of) the proof that the protocol has a safety property. Section 7 gives related
work, and we conclude the paper in Sect 8.
2 CafeOBJ in a Nutshell
CafeOBJ[1,5] is mainly based on two logical foundations: initial and hidden
algebra. Initial algebra is used to specify abstract data types such as integers,
and hidden algebra[6,11] to specify abstract machines. There are two kinds of
sorts (corresponding to types in programming languages) in CafeOBJ. They
are visible and hidden sorts. A visible sort represents an abstract data type,
and a hidden sort the state space of an abstract machine. There are basically
two kinds of operations to hidden sorts. They are action and observation
operations. An action operation can change a state of an abstract machine.
It takes a state of an abstract machine and zero or more data, and returns
another (possibly the same) state of the abstract machine. Only observation
operations can be used to observe the inside of an abstract machine. An obser-
vation operation takes a state of an abstract machine and zero or more data,
and returns a value corresponding to the state. An action operation is basi-
cally speciﬁed with equations by describing how the value of each observation
operation changes relatively based on the values of observation operations in
a state after executing the action operation in the state.
Declarations of visible sorts are enclosed with [ and ], and those of hidden
ones with *[ and ]*. Declarations of observation and action operations start
with bop or bops, and those of other operations with op or ops. After bop
or op (or bops or ops), an operator is written (or more than one operator is
written), followed by : and a sequence of sorts (i.e. sorts of the operators’
arguments), and ended with -> and one sort (i.e. sort of the operators’ results).
Deﬁnitions of equations start with eq, and those of conditional ones with ceq.
After eq, two expressions, or terms connected by = are written, ended with
a full stop. After ceq, two terms connected by = are written, followed by if
and a term denoting a condition, and ended with a full stop.
The CafeOBJ system, an implementation of CafeOBJ, rewrites (reduces)
a given term by regarding equations as left-to-right rewrite rules. This exe-
cutability makes it possible to simulate described systems and to verify that
they possess some desired properties.
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3 Observational Transition Systems
We assume that there exists a universal state space called Υ. When we de-
scribe a system, the system is basically modeled by observing only quantities
that are relevant to the system and that interest us from the outside of each
state of Υ. An observational transition system (ots)[19,20] can be used to
model a system in this way. UNITY[3] is an ancestor of ots’s, which are
reformalized by adopting the concept of hidden algebra[6,11].
An ots S = 〈O, I, T 〉 consists of:
• O : A set of observations. Each observation o ∈ O is a function o : Υ→ D
mapping each υ ∈ Υ into some typed value in D (D may be diﬀerent for
each observation). The value returned by an observation (in a state) is
called the value of the observation (in the state).
Given an ots S and two states υ1, υ2 ∈ Υ, the equality between two states,
denoted by υ1 =S υ2, with respect to S is deﬁned as follows:
υ1 =S υ2 iﬀ ∀o ∈ O.o(υ1) = o(υ2),
where ‘=’ in o(υ1) = o(υ2) is supposed to be well deﬁned for the range of
each o ∈ O. S may be removed from =S if it is clear from the context.
• I : The initial condition. This condition speciﬁes the initial value of each
observation that deﬁnes initial states of the ots.
• T : A set of conditional transition rules. Each transition rule τ ∈ T is a
relation between states provided that, for each state υ ∈ Υ, there exists
a state υ′ ∈ Υ, called a successor state, such that τ(υ, υ′) and moreover,
for each state υ1, υ2, υ
′
1, υ
′
2 ∈ Υ such that υ1 =S υ2, τ(υ1, υ′1) and τ(υ2, υ′2),
υ′1 =S υ
′
2. τ can be regarded as a function on equivalent classes of Υ with
respect to =S . Therefore, we assume that τ(υ) denotes the representative
element of the equivalent class the successor states of υ with respect to τ
belong to, and τ(υ) is called the successor state of υ with respect to τ .
The condition cτ for a transition rule τ ∈ T is called the eﬀective condi-
tion. Given a state, its truth value can be determined by only the values of
observations in the state. Predicates of this kind are called state predicates.
Given a state υ ∈ Υ, cτ is true in υ, namely τ is eﬀective in υ, iﬀ υ =S τ(υ).
Multiple similar observations or transition rules may be indexed. Gen-
erally, observations and transition rules are denoted by oi1,...,im and τj1,...,jn ,
respectively, provided that m,n ≥ 0 and we assume that there exist data
types Dk such that k ∈ Dk (k = i1, . . . , im, j1, . . . , jn). For example, an integer
array a possessed by a process p may be denoted by an observation ap, and
the increment of the ith element of the array may be denoted by a transition
rule incap,i.
Given an ots, a set of inﬁnite sequences of states is obtained. The inﬁnite
sequence of states is called an execution of the ots. More speciﬁcally, an
execution of an ots S is an inﬁnite sequence s0, s1, . . . of states satisfying:
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• Initiation : For each o ∈ O, o(s0) satisﬁes I.
• Consecution : For each i ∈ {0, 1, . . .}, si+1 =S τ(si) for some τ ∈ T .
• Fairness : For each τ ∈ T , there exist an inﬁnite number of indexes i ∈
{0, 1, . . .} such that si+1 =S τ(si).
A state is called reachable with respect to S if it appears in an execution of S.
Important properties that an ots may have are basically classiﬁed into two
classes: safety and liveness (or progress) properties. We only describe safety
properties and how to prove that an ots has a safety property in this paper.
Safety properties are deﬁned as follows: a predicate p : Υ→ {true, false} is a
safety property with respect to S iﬀ p is a state predicate and p(υ) holds for
every reachable υ ∈ Υ.
If we prove that an ots has a safety property p, the following induction is
mainly used:
• Base case: For any state υ ∈ Υ in which each observation o ∈ O satisﬁes I,
we show that p(υ) holds.
• Inductive step: Given any reachable state υ ∈ Υ such that p(υ) holds, we
show that, for any transition rule τ ∈ T , p(τ(υ)) also holds.
An ots S is described in CafeOBJ. The universal state space Υ is denoted
by a hidden sort, say Sys, by declaring *[Sys]*.
An observation oi1,...,im ∈ O is denoted by a CafeOBJ observation oper-
ation. We assume that data types Dk (k = i1, . . . , im) and D are described
in initial algebra and there exist visible sorts Sk (k = i1, . . . , im) and S cor-
responding to the data types. The CafeOBJ observation operation denoting
oi1,...,im is declared as follows:
bop o : Sys Si1 . . . Sim -> S
The initial condition I, the value of each observation in any initial state,
is described by declaring a constant (an operator without any arguments)
denoting any initial state and specifying the value of each observation in the
state with equations. First, the constant init denoting any initial state is
declared as follows:
op init : -> Sys
Suppose that the initial value of oi1,...,im is f(i1, . . . , im), this can be described
in CafeOBJ as follows:
eq o(init,Xi1,. . . ,Xim) = f(Xi1,. . . ,Xim) .
where Xk (k = i1, . . . , im) is a CafeOBJ variable with Sk, and f(Xi1,. . . ,Xim)
means a term (consisting of Xi1 , . . . , Xim) corresponding to f(i1, . . . , im).
A transition rule τj1,...,jn ∈ T is denoted by a CafeOBJ action operation.
We assume that data types Dk (k = j1, . . . , jn) are described in initial algebra
and there exist visible sorts Sk (k = j1, . . . , jn) corresponding to the data
types. The CafeOBJ action operation denoting τj1,...,jn is declared as follows:
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bop a : Sys Sj1 . . . Sjn -> Sys
If τj1,...,jn is executed in a state in which it is eﬀective, the value of oi1,...,im
may be changed, which can be described in CafeOBJ generally as follows:
ceq o(a(S,Xj1,. . . ,Xjn),Xi1,. . . ,Xim)
= e-a(S,Xj1,. . . ,Xjn,Xi1,. . . ,Xim) if c-a(S,Xj1,. . . ,Xjn) .
where e-a(S,Xj1,. . . ,Xjn,Xi1,. . . ,Xim) means a term (consisting of S, Xj1 , . . . ,
Xjn , Xi1 , . . . , Xim) corresponding to the value of oi1,...,im in the successor state,
and c-a(S,Xj1,. . . ,Xjn) means a term (consisting of S, Xj1 , . . . , Xjn) corre-
sponding to cτj1,...,jn .
If τj1,...,jn is executed in a state in which it is not eﬀective, the value of
any observation is not changed. Therefore, all we have to do is to declare the
following equation:
ceq a(S,Xj1,. . . ,Xjn) = S if not c-a(S,Xj1,. . . ,Xjn) .
If the value of oi1,...,im is not aﬀected by executing τj1,...,jn in any state
(regardless of the truth value of cτj1,...,jn ), the following equation is declare:
eq o(a(S,Xj1,. . . ,Xjn),Xi1,. . . ,Xim) = o(S,Xi1,. . . ,Xim) .
4 The NSLPK Protocol
Needham and Schroeder[18] proposed an authentication protocol, called the
NSPK protocol, with public-key cryptosystems in 1978. Lowe[15] found out
17 years later that there was a serious attack on the protocol that an intruder
could impersonate another agent to establish a session with yet another agent.
He also proposed one possible correction, which is called the NSLPK protocol
in this paper.
The NSLPK protocol uses public-key cryptosystems in order to establish
mutual authentication between two principals. For each principal p, there is a
public key denoted by k(p), which any principal can obtain from a key server.
Each principal p also has a private key that is the inverse of k(p). A messagem
encrypted with a public key k is denoted by {m}k. Any principal can encrypt
a message m with p’s public key to generate {m}k(p), while only p can decrypt
this message, which ensures secrecy. The protocol also uses nonces that can
be represented by large random numbers.
The NSLPK protocol could be described as follows:
Message 1 p1 → p2 : p1.p2.{np1 .p1}k(p2)
Message 2 p2 → p1 : p2.p1.{np1 .np2 .p2}k(p1)
Message 3 p1 → p2 : p1.p2.{np2}k(p2)
p1 is an initiator that tries establishing a session with a responder p2. p1 starts
a run of the protocol by creating a nonce np1 and sending it along with its
identity to p2, encrypted with p2’s public key. This kind of messages are called
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messages of type 1. When p2 receives the message, it decrypts the message
with its private key to obtain the nonce np1 . It then returns np1 along with
a new nonce np2 as well as its identity to p1, encrypted with p1’s public key.
This kind of messages are called messages of type 2. When p1 receives the
message, it decrypts the message with its private key to conﬁrm that the
message contains np1 and p2, which should make p1 assured that p1 is talking
to p2 because only p2 should be able to decrypt the message of type 1 to obtain
np1 . p1 then returns np2 to p2, encrypted with p2’s public key. This kind of
messages are called messages of type 3. Receiving the message should make
p2 assured that p2 is talking to p1 because only p1 should be able to decrypt
the message of type 2 to obtain np2 .
The ﬁrst and second ﬁelds of messages are called the source and destination
ﬁelds respectively. The last ﬁeld of encrypted parts of messages of type 1 and
2 is called the principal ﬁeld.
5 Modeling
Let us model a system in which an arbitrary number of principals take part
in the NSLPK protocol as an ots. One of the principals is assumed to be an
intruder. The intruder obeys the basic assumptions of the Dolev-Yao model[7].
All it can do illegally is enumerated as follows:
• It can intercept any message that is being delivered. If nonces included in
the message are encrypted with the intruder’s public key, the nonces are
gleaned, and otherwise the message is stored as it is.
• It can make fake messages of nonces or messages that are kept in store.
If a fake message is made of nonces, the nonces are encrypted with any
principal’s public key and any other ﬁeld of the message is ﬁlled with any
principal. If it is made of a message, only the source and destination ﬁelds
are changed with any principal.
The following assumption on nonce creation is also used:
Nonce Creation Every time a principal creates a nonce, the nonce is really
fresh, which has never appeared in the system so far.
The following operations on messages are used in the rest of the paper:
isMsg1, isMsg2 and isMsg3 are predicates checking if a message is type 1, type
2 and type 3, respectively, getS and getD return the source and destination
ﬁelds of a message respectively, getP returns the principal ﬁeld of a message
if the message is either type 1 or type 2, getK returns the public key used in a
message, getN1 returns the (ﬁrst) nonce of a message, and getN2 returns the
second nonce of a message if the message is type 2.
First the genuine parts of the system are modeled. For any pair of diﬀerent
principals p1, p2 and any role r ∈ {Ini,Res}, we have the following observa-
tions: lp1,p2,r, n1p1,p2,r and n2p1,p2,r. lp1,p2,Ini is used for p1 as initiator, having
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one of the four possible values i1, i2, i3 and i4, while lp1,p2,Res is used for p1 as
responder, having one of the four possible values r1, r2, r3 and r4. If lp1,p2,Ini is
i1, i2, i3 and i4, p1 as initiator is ready for starting a new run of the protocol
with p2, ready for receiving a message of type 2 from p2, ready for sending
a message of type 3 to p2 and has a session with p2, respectively. If lp1,p2,Res
is r1, r2, r3 and r4, p1 as responder is ready for receiving a message of type
1 from p2, ready for sending a message of type 2 to p2, ready for receiving a
message of type 3 from p2 and has a session with p2, respectively. n1p1,p2,Ini
and n2p1,p2,Ini are used for p1 so as to record the nonce created by p1 and the
nonce received from p2 respectively when p1 as initiator tries establishing or
has a session with p2 as responder. n1p1,p2,Res and n2p1,p2,Res are used for p1
so as to record the nonce received from p2 and the nonce created by p1 re-
spectively when p1 as responder tries establishing or has a session with p2 as
initiator. Initially lp1,p2,Ini is i1, lp1,p2,Res is r1, and n1p1,p2,r and n2p1,p2,r are an
arbitrary value that is never used as nonce.
We have two more observations: nw and n. nw denotes the underlying
computer network connecting the principals. It is a multiset, or a bag of
messages. n denotes the nonce created next. Initially nw is empty and n is
an arbitrary value that can be used as nonce.
We have the transition rules shown in Table 1. msgi+{p1,p2} corresponds to
that p1 sends a message of type i to p2, while msgi−{p1,p2,m} to that p1 receives
messagem of type i sent by p2, where i ∈ {1, 2, 3}. end{p1,p2,r} ﬁnishes a session
of p1 as r with p2 as ¬r, where ¬Ini = Res and ¬Res = Ini. Their eﬀective
conditions are shown in Table 1.
Table 1
Transition rules for any pair of diﬀerent principals p1, p2 and any message m and
their eﬀective conditions.
Trans. rules Eﬀective conditions
msg1+p1,p2 lp1,p2,Ini = i1 ∧ p1 = p2
msg2+p1,p2 lp1,p2,Res = r2 ∧ p1 = p2
msg3+p1,p2 lp1,p2,Ini = i3 ∧ p1 = p2
msg1−p1,p2,m lp1,p2,Res = r1 ∧ p1 = p2 ∧m ∈ nw ∧ isMsg1 (m) ∧ getS(m) = p2∧
getD(m) = p1 ∧ getK (m) = k(p1) ∧ getP(m) = p2
msg2−p1,p2,m lp1,p2,Ini} = i2 ∧ p1 = p2 ∧m ∈ nw ∧ isMsg2 (m) ∧ getS(m) = p2∧
getD(m) = p1 ∧ getK (m) = k(p1) ∧ getP(m) = p2 ∧ getN1 (m) = n1p1,p2,Ini
msg3−p1,p2,m lp1,p2,Res = r3 ∧ p1 = p2 ∧m ∈ nw ∧ isMsg3 (m) ∧ getS(m) = p2∧
getD(m) = p1 ∧ getK (m) = k(p1) ∧ getN1 (m) = n2p1,p2,Res
endp1,p2,Ini lp1,p2,Ini = i4 ∧ p1 = p2
endp1,p2,Res lp1,p2,Res = r4 ∧ p1 = p2
Next the inherent parts of the intruder, say I, are modeled. For intruder
I, we have the four observations: nonces, msg1s , msg2s and msg3s . nonces
is a set of nonces that the intruder has gleaned. msgis where i ∈ {1, 2, 3} is a
set of messages of type i that the intruder has gleaned. The initial values of
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the four observations are empty.
For intruder I, we have the transition rules shown in Table 2. interceptm
intercepts message m if m ∈ nw , and gleans nonces in the message if the
nonces are encrypted with the intruder’s public key and the message as it is
otherwise. fakei+p1,p2,m uses message m in msgis to generate a message of
type i, and fakei ′+p1,p2,n1[,n2] uses nonces n1 [and n2] in nonces to generate a
message of type i, where i ∈ {1, 2, 3}. Their eﬀective conditions are shown in
Table 2.
Table 2
Intruder’s inherent transition rules for any pair of diﬀerent principals p1, p2, any
message m and any nonces n1, n2 and their eﬀective conditions.
Trans. rules Eﬀective conditions
interceptm m ∈ nw
fakei+p1,p2,m, i ∈ {1, 2, 3} M ∈ msgis ∧ p1 = p2
fakei ′+p1,p2,n1[,n2], i ∈ {1, 2, 3} n1 ∈ nonces ∧ [n2 ∈ nonces∧]p1 = p2
The ots is described in CafeOBJ. The signature is as follows:
pr(PRINCIPAL + NONCE + MSG + LOCATION + ROLE + SET(NONCE)*{sort Set -> SetOfNonces})
pr(SET(MSG)*{sort Set -> SetOfMsg} + BAG(MSG)*{sort Bag -> Network})
*[Sys]*
-- any initial state
op init : -> Sys
-- observation operations
bop l : Sys Prin Prin Role -> Loc
bops n1 n2 : Sys Prin Prin Role -> Nonce
bop nonces : Sys -> SetOfNonces
bop msg1s msg2s msg3s : Sys -> SetOfMsg
bop nw : Sys -> Network
bop n : Sys -> Nonce
-- action operations
bop msg1+ msg2+ msg3+ : Sys Prin Prin -> Sys
bop msg1- msg2- msg3- : Sys Prin Prin Msg -> Sys
bop end : Sys Prin Prin Role -> Sys
bop intercept : Sys Msg -> Sys
bop fake1+ fake2+ fake3+ : Sys Prin Prin Msg -> Sys
bop fake1’+ fake3’+ : Sys Prin Prin Nonce -> Sys
bop fake2’+ : Sys Prin Prin Nonce Nonce -> Sys
A comment starts with -- and terminates at the end of the line.
PRINCIPAL, NONCE, MSG, LOCATION and ROLE are modules for principals,
nonces, messages, locations such as i1 and r1, and roles. Prin, Nonce, Msg, Loc
and Role are visible sorts denoting these data. These modules are imported
so that the data can be used. SET is a parameterized module for sets with
one parameter. Two instances of SET are imported. One is instantiated with
NONCE, and the other with Msg. SetOfNonces and SetOfMsg are visible sorts
denoting a set of nonces and a set of messages. BAG is also a parameterized
module for bags with one parameter. One instance is imported, instantiated
with MSG. Network is a visible sort denoting a bag of messages, namely the
underlying computer network. Note that BOOL that is a module for Boolean
values is implicitly imported and Bool is a visible sort denoting the values.
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In the speciﬁcation, msg1, msg2 and msg3 are the data constructors for
messages of type 1, 2 and 3, respectively. Suppose that p1, p2, p3 are terms
denoting principals p1, p2, p3, n1, n2 denoting nonces n1, n2, and k denot-
ing a public key k, terms msg1(p1,p2,k,n1,p3), msg2(p1,p2,k,n1,n2,p3)
and msg3(p1,p2,k,n1) denote messages p1.p2.{n1.p3}k, p1.p2.{n1.n2.p3}k and
p1.p2.{n1}k, respectively.
In the speciﬁcation, basically we have 15 sets of equations: one for any
initial state and the others for 14 action operations. In this paper, we show
two sets of equations for msg1+ and intercept.
In the rest of the section, S is a CafeOBJ variable for Sys, P1, P2, P3 and
P4 for Prin, N1 and N2 for Nonce, R1 and R2 for Role, and M for Msg.
The following is the equations for msg1+:
op c1-msg1+ : Sys Prin Prin -> Bool
eq c1-msg1+(S,P1,P2) = l(S,P1,P2,Ini) = i1 and not(P1 = P2) .
--
ceq l(msg1+(S,P1,P2),P3,P4,R1)
= (if P1 = P3 and P2 = P4 and R1 = Ini then i2 else l(S,P3,P4,R1) fi)
if c1-msg1+(S,P1,P2) .
ceq n1(msg1+(S,P1,P2),P3,P4,R1)
= (if P1 = P3 and P2 = P4 and R1 = Ini then n(S) else n1(S,P3,P4,R1) fi)
if c1-msg1+(S,P1,P2) .
eq n2(msg1+(S,P1,P2),P3,P4,R1) = n2(S,P3,P4,R1) .
eq nonces(msg1+(S,P1,P2)) = nonces(S) .
eq msg1s(msg1+(S,P1,P2)) = msg1s(S) .
eq msg2s(msg1+(S,P1,P2)) = msg2s(S) .
eq msg3s(msg1+(S,P1,P2)) = msg3s(S) .
ceq nw(msg1+(S,P1,P2)) = msg1(P1,P2,k(P2),n(S),P1),nw(S) if c1-msg1+(S,P1,P2) .
ceq n(msg1+(S,P1,P2)) = new(n(S)) if c1-msg1+(S,P1,P2) .
ceq msg1+(S,P1,P2) = S if not c1-msg1+(S,P1,P2) .
The term c1-msg1+(S,P1,P2) denotes the eﬀective condition of transition
rule msg1+P1,P2 in state (denoted by) S. Comma ‘,’ is the data constructor for
bags. The term msg1(P1,P2,k(P2),n(S),P1) , nw(S) denotes the computer
network after putting the message of type 1 into the computer network denoted
by nw(S).
CafeOBJ provides built-in operator _==_, but it could be sometimes trou-
blesome unless you are certain that the CafeOBJ speciﬁcation regarded as a
term rewriting system is conﬂuent. Therefore, for each data structure used,
we deﬁne operator _=_ that checks if two values are equal. The operator
is given operator attribute comm declaring that the operator is commutative.
Necessary equations for deﬁning operator _=_ should be described.
The following is the equations for intercept:
eq l(intercept(S,M),P1,P2,R1) = l(S,P1,P2,R1) .
eq n1(intercept(S,M),P1,P2,R1) = n1(S,P1,P2,R1) .
eq n2(intercept(S,M),P1,P2,R1) = n2(S,P1,P2,R1) .
ceq nonces(intercept(S,M))
= (if getK(M) = k(I) and (isMsg1(M) or isMsg3(M))
then getN1(M) nonces(S) else nonces(S) fi) if M \in nw(S) .
ceq nonces(intercept(S,M))
= (if getK(M) = k(I) and isMsg2(M)
then getN1(M) getN2(M) nonces(S) else nonces(S) fi) if M \in nw(S) .
ceq msg1s(intercept(S,M))
= (if not(getK(M) = k(I)) and isMsg1(M)
then M msg1s(S) else msg1s(S) fi) if M \in nw(S) .
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ceq msg2s(intercept(S,M))
= (if not(getK(M) = k(I)) and isMsg2(M)
then M msg2s(S) else msg2s(S) fi) if M \in nw(S) .
ceq msg3s(intercept(S,M))
= (if not(getK(M) = k(I)) and isMsg3(M)
then M msg3s(S) else msg3s(S) fi) if M \in nw(S) .
ceq nw(intercept(S,M)) = nw(S) - M if M \in nw(S) .
eq n(intercept(S,M)) = n(S) .
ceq intercept(S,M) = S if not M \in nw(S) .
Juxtaposition operation is the data constructor for sets. The term M msg1s(S)
denotes the set obtained by putting M into the set denoted by msg1s(S).
The speciﬁcation has 10 modules, and is of about 400 lines. The main
module is NSLPK in which the signature and equations that have been just
described are written, and is about of 300 lines.
6 Verification
Claim 6.1 In any reachable state, the intruder cannot impersonate another
principal p to establish a session with yet another principal q.
Proof. All we have to do is to show that, in any reachable state, the intruder
never obtains nonces generated by either p or q to establish sessions with each
other, which immediately follows from Lemma6.2. ✷
Let n be an arbitrary one of nonces generated by either p or q to establish
sessions with each other.
Lemma 6.2 For any reachable state S, any principals P1, P2, P3, any public
key K, any nonce N, any message M,
pr1 ∧ pr2 ∧ pr3 ∧ pr4 ∧ pr5 ∧ pr6 ∧ pr7∧
pr8 ∧ pr9 ∧ pr10 ∧ pr11 ∧ pr12 ∧ pr13 ∧ pr14
where
pr1 ≡ ¬(n ∈ nonces(S)), pr2 ≡ ¬(msg1(P1,P2,K,n,I) ∈ msg1s(S)),
pr3 ≡ ¬(msg2(P1,P2,K,N,n,I) ∈ msg2s(S)), pr4 ≡ ¬(msg1(P1,P2,K,n,I) ∈ nw(S)),
pr5 ≡ ¬(msg2(P1,P2,K,N,n,I) ∈ nw(S)), pr6 ≡ ¬(msg1(P1,P2,k(I),n,P3) ∈ nw(S)),
pr7 ≡ ¬(msg2(P1,P2,k(I),n,N,P3) ∈ nw(S)), pr8 ≡ ¬(msg2(P1,P2,k(I),N,n,P3) ∈ nw(S)),
pr9 ≡ ¬(msg3(P1,P2,k(I),n) ∈ nw(S)), pr10 ≡ n1(S,P1,I,Res) = n,
pr11 ≡ n2(S,P1,I,Ini) = n, pr12 ≡ M ∈ msg1s(S) ⇒ getK(M) = k(I),
pr13 ≡ M ∈ msg2s(S) ⇒ getK(M) = k(I), pr14 ≡ M ∈ msg3s(S) ⇒ getK(M) = k(I).
Proof. The lemma is proved with the CafeOBJ system as proof score execu-
tor. The proof is done by induction described in Sect. 3.
First we write a module in which the predicate to be proved is deﬁned.
The module looks like as follows:
mod PRED1 {
pr(NSLPK)
op pr1 : Sys -> Bool
op pr2 : Sys Prin Prin Key -> Bool
...
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op pr : Sys Prin Prin Prin Key Nonce Msg -> Bool
op n : -> Nonce
...
eq (non = n) = false . -- non is any value never used as nonces.
eq pr1(S) = not(n \in nonces(S)) .
eq pr2(S,P1,P2,K) = not(msg1(P1,P2,K,n,I) \in msg1s(S)) .
...
eq pr14(S,M) = M \in msg3s(S) implies not(getK(M) = k(I)) .
eq pr(S,P1,P2,P3,K,N,M) = p1(S) and p2(S,P1,P2,K) and ... and p14(S,M) .
}
In this section, S is a CafeOBJ variable for Sys, P1, P2 and P3 for Prin, N for
Nonce, K for Key, and M for Msg.
For the base case, all we have to do is to have the CafeOBJ system execute
the following proof score:
open PRED1
red pr(init,P1,P2,P3,K,N,M) .
close
By opening a module with CafeOBJ command open, we can use the opera-
tions, variables and equations declared in the module.
For the inductive step, given an arbitrary reachable state s in which the
predicate holds, for any transition rule, we show that the predicate is still true
in the successor state s’. We write a module describing what state s looks
like. The module looks like as follows:
mod ISTEP1 {
pr(PRED1)
ops s s’ : -> Sys
...
-- inductive hypothesis
eq n \in nonces(s) = false .
eq msg1(P1,P2,K,n,I) \in msg1s(s) = false .
...
eq M \in msg3s(s) and (getK(M) = k(I)) = false .
}
If a logical formula is described as an equation, the formula is converted into
an exclusive-or canonical form a` la Hsiang[14] because the CafeOBJ system
reduces a logical formula into such an exclusive-or canonical form.
One of the crucial activities in the inductive step is doing case analysis.
Case analysis is done based on the eﬀective conditions of the transition rules
shown in Table 1 and Table 2.
We describe the proof that the predicate pr is still true in the the successor
state msg1+(s,p1,p2) for any principals p1, p2. We ﬁrst consider two cases.
One corresponds to states in which transition rule msg1+p1,p2 is eﬀective, and
the other to ones in which it is not. The proof score for the former case is as
follows:
open ISTEP1
-- arbitrary chosen objects
ops p1 p2 : -> Prin .
-- assumption
eq l(s,p1,p2,Ini) = i1 .
eq (p1 = p2) = false .
-- facts, etc.
-- the successor state
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eq s’ = msg1+(s,p1,p2) .
-- check if the predicate is true in s’.
red pr(s’,P1,P2,P3,K,N,M) .
close
Having the CafeOBJ system execute the proof score, it returns the following
term:
msg1(P1,P2,k(I),n,P3) \in (msg1(p1,p2,k(p2),n(s),p1) , nw(s)) and
msg1(P1,P2,K,n,I) \in (msg1(p1,p2,k(p2),n(s),p1) , nw(s)) xor
msg1(P1,P2,k(I),n,P3) \in (msg1(p1,p2,k(p2),n(s),p1) , nw(s)) xor
msg1(P1,P2,K,n,I) \in (msg1(p1,p2,k(p2),n(s),p1) , nw(s)) xor true
The term means that neither the message msg1(P1,P2,k(I),n,P3) nor the
message msg1(P1,P2,K,n,I) is in the network (msg1(p1,p2,k(p2),n(s),p1)
, nw(s)) because ¬(p ∨ q) = p ∧ q ⊕ p ⊕ q ⊕ true. Therefore, if neither p1
nor p2 equals intruder I, the term should be true. Hence, the case is split
into three subcases: the ﬁrst one in which p1 = I and p2 = I, the second
one in which p1 = I, and the last one in which p2 = I. The result of the
case analysis for checking if the predicate is still true in the successor state
msg1+(s,p1,p2) is shown in Table 3.
Table 3
Case analysis for checking if the predicate is still true in the successor state
msg1+(s,p1,p2) for any reachable state s in which the predicate holds and any
principals p1,p2.
no. the successor state cases subcases
1 p1 = I ∧ p2 = I
2 msg1+(s,p1,p2) l(s,p1,p2,Ini) = i1 ∧ p1 = p2 p1 = I
3 p2 = I
4 ¬(l(s,p1,p2,Ini) = i1 ∧ p1 = p2) —
We show the proof corresponding to case 2 in Table 3. The proof score is
as follows:
open ISTEP1
-- arbitrary chosen objects
ops p1 p2 : -> Prin .
-- assumption
eq l(s,I,p2,Ini) = i1 . -- for p1 = I
eq (I = p2) = false . -- for P1 = I
eq p1 = I .
-- facts, etc. (n(s) is created by I and I cannot create the same nonce as n
-- due to Nonce Creation. So, it must be different from n.)
eq (n = n(s)) = false .
-- the successor state
eq s’ = msg1+(s,p1,p2) .
-- check if the predicate is true in s’.
red p(s’,P1,P2,P3,K,N,M) .
close
In the proof score, we use the assumption on Nonce Creation. Having the
CafeOBJ system execute the proof score, it returns true.
The proof corresponding to case 4 in Table 3 is not necessary so long as
the speciﬁcation is intentionally and correctly written because there must be
no diﬀerence between s and msg1+(s,p1,p2) in this case. However, it is
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helpful to do the proof corresponding to this case so as to ﬁnd errors in the
speciﬁcation.
We can prove that any other transition rule preserves the predicate in a
similar way. We have considered 39 cases all together for the inductive step.✷
All the proof scores are of about 800 lines. It took about 12 seconds to
have the CafeOBJ system load the speciﬁcation and execute the proof scores
on a laptop with 850MHz Pentium III processor and 512MB memory.
7 Related Work
Several methods of formally analysing authentication protocols have been pro-
posed. Among them are methods using model checkers[4,16], ones using theo-
rem provers[21,22], ones based on strand spaces[8,9] and ones based on multiset
rewriting[2,4].
Our approach is similar to methods using theorem provers, especially Paul-
son’s Inductive Method[21]. Inductive Method models an authentication pro-
tocols by inductively deﬁning traces of messages from a set of rules that corre-
spond to the possible actions of the principals including the intruder, and secu-
rity properties can be stated as predicates over the traces. You can inductively
prove that a certain property holds of all possible traces for an authentication
protocol with the theorem prover Isabelle/HOL. In our approach, sequences of
states (of an authentication protocol) instead of messages are deﬁned, and an
implementation (the CafeOBJ system) of an algebraic speciﬁcation language
instead of a general theorem prover is used to support veriﬁcation. Since our
approach uses only rewriting to prove that an authentication protocol has
a safety property and does not use any heavy and slow operation such as
(higher-order) uniﬁcation, we may expect that our approach executes proof
scores faster than methods using general theorem provers.
As concerns modeling sending and receiving messages, our approach is
similar to the method based on strand spaces[8,9]. We model each of sending
and receiving a message as an independent atomic action as the strand space-
based method.
We model a computer network as a bag of messages, which has been af-
fected by object-oriented speciﬁcation in Maude[17]. Maude is also a member
of OBJ language family as CafeOBJ. G.Denker, et al.[4] describe a ﬁnite
state system of the NSPK protocol in Maude and automatically ﬁnds Lowe’s
attack[15] using the Maude rewrite engine as a model checker.
We should notice that writing proof scores in algebraic speciﬁcation lan-
guages was ﬁrst advocated by Goguen’s group and developed for more than
15 years in OBJ community[12]. This paper also shows that the approach can
be applied to analysing security protocols.
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8 Conclusion
A system in which an arbitrary number of principals, one of which is an
intruder, take part in the NSLPK protocol has been modeled as an ots and
the ots has been speciﬁed in CafeOBJ. we have proved that the intruder cannot
impersonate another principal to establish a session with yet another principal
by writing proof scores and having the CafeOBJ system execute them. We
expect that our approach may model and verify other authentication protocols
adequately.
In this case study, writing the proof scores was done by hand, which was
less time-consuming than expected though. It took a couple of days to write
the proof scores. Since the proof scores are very stylized as you have seen,
however, we hope that writing proof scores can be automated to some extent.
The point of writing proof scores for a proof is case analysis and to ﬁnd lemmas
to make progress on the proof. The former can be done based on the eﬀective
condition of each transition rule, which is expected to be performed auto-
matically. We may have to split the case corresponding to states in which a
transition rule is eﬀective into multiple subcases, which is related to the latter
and done by repeatedly writing proof scores and having the CafeOBJ system
execute them. We are going to design and implement a software tool sup-
porting writing proof scores. A proof assistant such as the Kumo system[13]
developed by Goguen’s group could also be used to generate proof scores.
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